Can the US cancel Iran’s Hormuz get out of jail free card?

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Iran‘s closure of the Strait of Hormuz energy chokepoint was the linchpin of its recent victory over the United States. There is no question that Iran is the victor as things stand. While suffering vast damage to its economy, military, and leadership, the Islamic Republic has held on. Not only that, but President Donald Trump is now allowing Iran free rein to sell tens of billions of dollars of oil. Iran will use some of the proceeds for terrorism. Major sanctions relief also beckons over the horizon as the two countries move to negotiate a final end to the war. And while this sanctions relief is dependent upon Iranian nuclear concessions, Trump’s desperation to end the war suggests that his terms will be lenient.

Yet, whatever happens at the diplomatic level, U.S. military planners will now be strategizing on how to better prevent Iran from leveraging any future Strait of Hormuz closure. Those planners know that from the perspective of their political leadership, it is intolerable that American military power was neutered by an enemy that relied upon inexpensive weapons and the concealment of its anti-ship forces along Iran’s rugged mountainous coastline. If the U.S. cannot mitigate this threat going forward, its already damaged credibility and the future of vital Middle Eastern energy flows will suffer greatly. But how can the U.S. make the Strait of Hormuz safer?

FEEBLE IRAN DEAL A FITTING END TO A FOOLISH WAR

The first imperative will be for political leaders to more honestly accept what can and cannot be done.

The simple truth is that the hundreds of miles of Iranian coastline in and around the Strait of Hormuz mean that no defensive effort can be entirely successful. Because international shipping companies rely upon civilian insurance schemes, even a marginal Iranian threat presents outsize deterrence against attempting a transit.

This is exacerbated by the fact that Iranian missile launches often limit effective defensive windows to mere seconds. The Trump administration might feasibly arrange a more comprehensive scheme with allies such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait to insure vessels. But as with a tentative effort in that regard during the war, it’s unclear whether this would facilitate stable transit activity in any future crisis. It certainly wouldn’t do so unless other steps could be taken to counter Iranian threats.

Here, the key for the U.S. and its allies, including European and Pacific allies who rely heavily on related energy supplies, would be to mitigate Iran’s future ability to hold the Strait of Hormuz hostage at scale.

Standing mitigation is a good first step. Consider the utility, for example, of bolstering alternate supply routes across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea, and Oman to the Arabian Sea. Positioning more air defense systems along these land-based pipelines would provide greater reliability of supply even in a crisis. But other, more forward-leaning action is also required to make the Strait of Hormuz more defensible.

For one, the U.S. could order and then deploy more of the Navy’s new mine-clearing unmanned sea vehicles. Allies could supplement these efforts, including with manned vessels. Considering the outsize importance of securing these waters for their economies, America’s Sunni-Arab allies would likely make significant contributions to the cost of these operations.

Equally valuable would be the deployment of new sensors and weapons systems to defend against Iranian missile and drone attacks. A big concern here is making the shooting down of missiles and drones more affordable and sustainable. This matters because the war in Iran has seen the U.S. heavily deplete its already inadequate supply of advanced air defense munitions. These munitions would be of absolutely crucial value in any war with China over Taiwan.

Alternate means of defeating Iranian missiles and drones include the EAGLS-APKWS rocket system, the Pulsar electronic warfare system, the LOCUST and HELIOS laser systems, and the Leonidas microwave system. But these are just the tip of the iceberg. The key would be to integrate these capabilities, perhaps under Anduril’s Lattice AI command-and-control cloud network, to form a hardened defensive umbrella. The strategic intent would be to provide a cost-efficient means to both incentivize Hormuz transits and deter Iran from attacks. During the recent war, Iran rightly judged that it could gain far more from launching attacks in the Strait of Hormuz than it would lose by doing so. But if only a very few Iranian weapons were able to penetrate defensive systems while the vast majority of Iranian launch units were quickly destroyed, that cost calculation would shift.

To that end, another imperative is to bolster situational awareness of where Iranian forces are hiding and moving.

The emplacement of hidden ground sensors that detect signals across the electromagnetic spectrum, or the movement of heavy vehicles, for example, would also enable U.S. forces to better anticipate where attacks might be staged from, as well as how Iranian forces are able to hide and resupply. To complement this effort, the CIA and allied intelligence services could prioritize the recruitment of Iranian personnel assigned to or commanding missile and drone forces. All of this would provide a greater and more persistent insight into Iranian threats.

WHAT WILL ANDY BURNHAM MEAN FOR THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP?

Again, however, this strategy would ultimately be designed to reduce rather than eliminate the threat. The Strait of Hormuz imposes a tyranny of space, time, and targets, complicating defensive efforts. The best way to win a battle here remains the same as prior to the war. Namely, to avoid this battle or fight it only where absolutely necessary.

It would also be a very good idea for nations to massively increase the depth of the strategic petroleum reserves now, before the next war begins.