Trump’s European nuclear weapons plan risks backfiring

Joining NATO talks in late May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the alliance’s status quo was not working. “There’s a broad recognition that there are going to be eventually less U.S. troops in Europe than there have historically been,” Rubio told reporters. Still, he argued that he was a “strong supporter” of NATO, calling it an important enabler of U.S. national security.

The Europeans are certainly taking notice.

The war in Ukraine and Trump’s perceived unreliability as an ally have provoked most European governments into higher defense spending. European military expenditure reached $864 billion in 2025, a 14% increase from the previous year. Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, is at the forefront of that shift, with a 24% rise in its defense budget over the same time period. Still, the recent chaotic disputes over U.S. troop levels in Europe have led the Trump administration to search for a way to bolster the alliance. Its possible solution?

Bring more U.S. nuclear weapons capable bombers, and perhaps more U.S. nuclear bombs, into more of Europe. A final decision hasn’t yet been made, but there’s no doubt that at least some European countries, particularly Poland and the Baltics, wouldn’t mind stationing U.S. nuclear-capable assets on their soil. Some politicians in Warsaw, such as Prime Minister Donald Tusk, have even broached Poland obtaining its own nuclear weapons.

To be clear, bringing additional U.S. nuclear assets into Europe sounds more dramatic than it really is. In reality, it might only be an extension of NATO’s established policy to allow NATO allies to carry U.S. nuclear weapons aboard their aircraft if Washington so approves. This nuclear-sharing arrangement has been ongoing since the early 1950s, and it was originally crafted to serve two U.S. objectives: deter the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe, and deter NATO allies from developing nuclear weapons of their own.

Yet 2026 isn’t 1956. And while a principal U.S. policy objective in Europe continues to be preventing Russia from waging war on NATO, Washington has also been trying for several administrations to get European allies to take primary responsibility for the defense of their own neighborhood. Europe is beginning to do just that. Trump is thus getting what he and many other presidents have long wanted.

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So, why even flirt with nuclear posture changes that risk undermining the very burden-shifting goals Trump is ostensibly invested in?

The risk is that by making U.S. security guarantees to Europe more credible, Trump risks reducing the Europeans’ incentive to keep boosting their military capabilities. The majority of European politicians would much rather choose butter over guns at a time when energy prices are high and their economies are stagnating. Viewed in this light, one hopes the Trump administration disposes of this plan. Nuclear assurances don’t offer much long-term value if they only reinforce a return to defensive dependence.